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1 Introduction
In practice, relationships between buyers and sellers are often plagued by infor-
mation asymmetries. For example, a manufacturer may have a more accurate
demand forecast for a product than his supplier. In M&A settings, the manage-
ment of the target company may have private information about its intangible
assets. However, most contract-theoretic studies of seller-buyer contracting prob-
lems assume that private information is uncertifiable (i.e., “soft”), so a privately
informed buyer can make arbitrary claims about a subjective information parame-
ter. Uncertifiable private information is a plausible assumption in some economic
applications, e.g. when a manager faces a worker who has private information
about the disutility caused by exerting effort or when a retailer faces consumers
who have private information about their tastes.
Yet, in particular in business-to-business relationships it may well be the case
that private information can be authenticated in a more objective way. For ex-
ample, a manufacturer might have verifiable evidence about his production tech-
nology and about market studies that are indicative of the profit that he will be
able to make with a supplier’s intermediate product. The management of a target
company might have verifiable evidence about the value of its intangible assets.
In the case of certifiable (i.e., “hard”) information, a privately informed buyer can
always claim to be uninformed (i.e., he can conceal evidence), but he cannot claim
to have information for which he has no evidence.1
In the first part of the paper, we study a simple adverse selection (i.e., screen-
ing) problem in which a seller offers a contract to a buyer who may have private
information with some exogenous probability.2 At first glance, one might guess
1Our usage of the terms “uncertifiable” and “certifiable” information follows Bolton and
Dewatripont’s (2005, chapter 5) leading textbook on the theory of contracting.
2Following Hart and Holmström (1987, p. 76), situations in which the agent may have pre-
contractual private information are usually categorized under the heading of “adverse selection”
models. In contrast, in “moral hazard” models there is symmetric information at the time of
contracting. For example, in a moral hazard problem a worker may exert unobservable effort af-
ter the contract has been signed. Moral hazard models often focus on risk-averse agents and the
trade-off between incentives and insurance, while in adverse selection models the focus is usu-
ally on risk-neutral decision makers (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Bolton and Dewatripont,
2005).
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that the total surplus generated by the two parties will be larger if the buyer’s
information is certifiable, since in this case the buyer has fewer possibilities to lie
than in the case of uncertifiable information. Yet, we will show that there are
situations in which the expected total surplus is strictly smaller when the buyer’s
information is certifiable.
The intuition behind this finding is as follows. Suppose that the buyer is
informed with a relatively high probability, but it is unlikely that his expected
revenue from trade is large. In the case of uncertifiable information, trade always
takes place, because the seller does not want to risk losing opportunities to trade
by offering a contract where the buyer has to make a large payment. Yet, in the
case of certifiable information, the seller has more instruments at her disposal,
since she can ask the buyer to present evidence. Thus, the seller offers a contract
where the buyer has to make a large payment, but the payment is reduced if
the buyer proves that his expected revenue is small. However, in this way an
uninformed buyer is excluded from trading. In other words, in this case the seller
does not use her additional instruments to create a larger pie, but to decrease the
buyer’s fraction of the pie, thereby reducing its size.
In the second part of the paper, the buyer can endogenously decide whether or
not to acquire private information. In our setup, the buyer may gather information
for opportunistic reasons; i.e., in order to increase his own profit at the expense of
the total gains from trade. For reasons similar to those in the case of exogenous
information, it again turns out that the expected total surplus can be strictly
smaller in the case of certifiable information than in the case of uncertifiable
information. Taken together, we conclude that certifiable private information
and strategic information acquisition may lead to serious frictions in seller-buyer
contracting, the implications of which deserve to be more thoroughly investigated
in future research.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we briefly discuss related literature. In Section 3, the basic model is
introduced. In Section 4, we study the case of an exogenously given information
structure. The information structure is endogenized in Section 5. Finally, con-
3
cluding remarks follow in Section 6. Some technical details have been relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Related literature
To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the first one that compares
the inefficiencies caused by certifiable and uncertifiable information in screening
problems with exogenous and endogenous information structures. In screening
problems, an uninformed principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent.
Most papers in the voluminous literature on screening focus on situations in which
the agent is known to have uncertifiable information. The classic papers are Baron
and Myerson (1982), who study the regulation of a monopolistic firm that has
private information about its costs, and Maskin and Riley (1984), who study
monopolistic price discrimination when customers have private information about
their valuations. A key finding of these papers is that trade is at its first-best level
(i.e., the level that maximizes the total surplus) for the best possible type (the
so-called “no distortion at the top” result), while otherwise there is a downward
distortion of the trade level. Lewis and Sappington (1993) have extended the
analysis of screening problems with uncertifiable information to the case in which
the agent may be uninformed with an exogenously given probability. Allowing
for the possibility that an agent may be ignorant can lead to even more severe
distortions away form the first-best solution.
With regard to certifiable information, following Grossman and Hart (1980)
there is a literature focused on signaling problems, where a privately informed
principal offers a contract to uninformed agents. In the context of takeover bids,
Grossman and Hart (1980) discuss the effects of requiring disclosure of certifiable
information as opposed to simply outlawing the making of false statements. A
key finding is that if it is commonly known that the principal is informed with cer-
tainty, an unravelling result holds according to which the principal fully discloses
all of his private information.3
3Cf. Milgrom (1981) and Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990). Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
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In a screening model where buyers may have certifiable information, Schmitz
(2007) shows that more competition (i.e., increasing the number of buyers) can
reduce the expected total surplus.
Moreover, certifiable information has also been studied in the context of collu-
sion in a principal/supervisor/agent setting by Tirole (1986).4 In his model, the
supervisor may learn evidence about the agent’s type. The supervisor can conceal
the evidence or reveal it to the principal, but the evidence cannot be forged. In
contrast to the present setting, in Tirole (1986) the agent always learns the state
of the world. Moreover, in Tirole (1986) the agent has to be induced to exert
unobservable effort (i.e., there is a moral hazard problem), while in our setting
the trade level is verifiable.
Crémer and Khalil (1992) have initiated a still relatively small literature on
screening problems with endogenous information, where the agent can privately
decide whether or not to incur costs in order to gather information. They consider
a firm that produces spare parts under contract for another firm. The latter firm
suddenly asks for a modification, but initially the first firm does not know how
costly the modification will be. Crémer and Khalil (1992) have pointed out that
while most papers in the adverse selection literature assume that asymmetric
information is exogenously given, the fundamental asymmetry may actually lie
in the ability to gather information. So far, in this literature it is assumed that
information is uncertifiable.5
Taken together, the present paper contributes to the contract-theoretic litera-
ture on screening problems by comparing the frictions caused by uncertifiable and
certifiable information, allowing for the possibility that the buyer may acquire
chapter 5) provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
4See also Laffont and Martimort (1999) for a related study of collusion in a three-tier hierarchy
with hard information.
5While Crémer and Khalil (1992), Crémer et al. (1998a), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2013a)
study opportunistic information acquisition that serves strategic purposes only, other papers such
as Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer et al. (1998b), Iossa and Martimort (2015), Su (2017a),
and Ye and Li (2018) study productive information gathering. Cf. Hoppe and Schmitz (2010),
who point out that information gathering can be a pure rent-seeking activity also in settings
different from the one initially considered by Crémer and Khalil (1992), in which information
becomes costlessly revealed at a later point in time.
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private information for strategic reasons.
3 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, a seller (she) and a buyer (he), who can trade
an intermediate product. For example, the seller may be a biotech firm that has
invented a novel technology. The buyer may be a pharmaceutical firm that can
benefit from the innovation, since it might be useful to produce existing products
at lower costs or to come up with new products.6 However, it is uncertain how
valuable the innovation will actually turn out to be. For instance, there may be
demand uncertainties regarding the buyer’s final product. Let R ≥ 0 denote the
buyer’s uncertain future revenue from acquiring the seller’s innovation, where R
is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. We suppose that R
is not contractible, since it may realize only in the distant future and since the
additional profits the buyer makes based on the seller’s input cannot be cleanly
disentangled from the buyer’s other business activities.
The sequence of events is as follows. At date 1, the seller offers to sell her
intermediate product to the buyer in exchange for a transfer payment t. At date
2, the buyer decides whether or not to accept the seller’s offer. If the buyer rejects,
both parties’ payoffs are normalized to zero. If the buyer accepts, his profit will be
qR− t and the seller’s profit is t, where q ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as quantity of
a divisible good or as probability of trade of an indivisible good. The quantity q
is chosen by the seller in line with the agreed-upon contract, since it is a verifiable
decision that can be enforced by the court.
At date 0, there is a random draw ω ∈ {H,L} by nature.7 In the good state of
the world, which occurs with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1), the buyer’s expected revenue
6In the present paper we do not study ownership structures, i.e. whether or not vertical
integration is optimal. With regard to contract-theoretic studies on the latter question, see Hart
(1995) for the case of symmetric information and Schmitz (2006) for the case of (uncertifiable)
asymmetric information.
7We focus on the two-types case since it allows us to present our novel insights in the simplest
way. Indeed, Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 134) have pointed out “the fact that few new
economic insights can be obtained in the continuum case” regarding types in adverse selection
models.
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is RH = E[R|ω = H]. In the bad state of the world, the buyer’s expected revenue
is only RL = E[R|ω = L], where 0 < RL < RH . At date 0, the buyer may
obtain private information about how valuable the seller’s intermediate product
might really turn out to be for the buyer’s business activities. Specifically, the
buyer learns the state of the world ω with probability ν ∈ [0, 1], and remains
uninformed otherwise. Hence, the buyer privately observes a signal σ ∈ {H,L, ∅}.
With probability ρν the signal is σ = H, in which case the buyer knows that his
expected revenue is RH . With probability (1 − ρ)ν the signal is σ = L, so the
buyer knows his expected revenue is RL. Finally, with probability 1−ν the signal
is σ = ∅, which means that the buyer has no information over and above what is
common knowledge, so his expected revenue is E[R] = ρRH + (1− ρ)RL.
8
In what follows, we will compare two scenarios. In scenario U, information is
uncertifiable. Hence, the buyer can make any claim σ̂ ∈ {H,L, ∅} about the signal
σ, regardless of its actual realization. This is the kind of private information that
is most often studied in the existing literature on screening problems.
In scenario C, information is certifiable. This means that the buyer can always
claim to be uninformed (even when this is not true), but he can claim that he
has received the signal σ = L or σ = H only if this is actually the case. Hence,
the buyer’s admissible claims in scenario C are σ̂ = ∅ if σ = ∅, σ̂ ∈ {H, ∅} if
σ = H, and σ̂ ∈ {L, ∅} if σ = L. Observe that in scenario C the buyer has fewer
possibilities to be dishonest than in scenario U.
4 Exogenous information
4.1 Scenario U : Uncertifiable information
We first consider scenario U, where the buyer is free to make any claim σ̂ ∈
{H,L, ∅} about the signal σ, since his claim cannot be verified regardless of the
8Note that for simplicity of the exposition the sellers’s costs are assumed to be zero; i.e.,
she already has produced the intermediate good. The results would not change qualitatively
if the seller incurred costs qC, where C < RL. We thus focus on the case in which the two
parties’ total profit is maximized by q = 1 regardless of the realization of ω, so that information
acquisition (to be studied in Section 5) can occur for strategic reasons only.
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state of the world.
We follow the mechanism design approach and look for the optimal contract
given the relevant information structure. In this way, one can characterize the op-
timal mechanism without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible
contracts that do not follow from the informational constraints. In particular, ac-
cording to the revelation principle, in order to find the seller’s maximum expected
profit we can without loss of generality confine our attention to direct revelation
mechanisms (see Myerson, 1982). In such a mechanism, the buyer is asked about
the realization of the signal σ. The mechanism specifies the trade level qσ̂ ∈ [0, 1]
and the transfer payment tσ̂ depending on the buyer’s claim σ̂ ∈ {H,L, ∅}. The
trade level and the transfer payment must be designed such that it is in the buyer’s
self-interest to report the truth. In the present context this means that the seller
offers a menu of contracts (qH , tH), (qL, tL), (q∅, t∅), such that a buyer who has
observed σ ∈ {H,L, ∅} will actually pick the contract that was intended for him.
It should be noted that the revelation principle does not say that in practice
the parties should use direct revelation mechanisms. Instead, direct revelation
mechanisms are just an analytical tool to characterize the seller’s maximum ex-
pected profit. According to the revelation principle, it is impossible to find a
contract that could yield a larger expected profit than the optimal direct revela-
tion mechanism. Once we have derived the maximum expected profits, we can
provide simple contracts that will yield the same outcome as the optimal direct
revelation mechanisms.
Now let us look for the optimal direct revelation mechanism. The seller’s
problem is to maximize her expected profit
ν[ρtH + (1− ρ)tL] + (1− ν)t∅
subject to the relevant constraints. Specifically, if σ = H, it will be in the buyer’s
self-interest to truthfully reveal the signal whenever the incentive-compatibility
constraints
qHRH − tH ≥ qLRH − tL (ICHL)
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and
qHRH − tH ≥ q∅RH − t∅ (ICH∅)
hold. The constraint (ICHL) ensures that the buyer does not claim that the signal
is L, while the constraint (ICH∅) ensures that he does not claim to be uninformed.
Similarly, the constraints
qLRL − tL ≥ qHRL − tH , (ICLH)
qLRL − tL ≥ q∅RL − t∅ (ICL∅)
make sure that the buyer will report the signal σ = L truthfully. Moreover, the
incentive-compatibility constraints with regard to the signal σ = ∅ are
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ qHE[R]− tH , (IC∅H)
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ qLE[R]− tL. (IC∅L)
Finally, in order to ensure that it is individually rational for the buyer to accept
the seller’s offer, the participation constraints
qHRH − tH ≥ 0, (PCH)
qLRL − tL ≥ 0, (PCL)
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ 0 (PC∅)
must be satisfied.
Observe that the constraints (ICH∅) and (IC∅H) imply qH(RH − E[R]) ≥
q∅(RH − E[R]), so the monotonicity constraint qH ≥ q∅ must hold. Similarly, the
constraints (IC∅L) and (ICL∅) imply the monotonicity constraint q∅ ≥ qL.
We now consider a relaxed problem in which we ignore some of the constraints.
Specifically, we maximize the seller’s expected profit subject to the constraints
(ICH∅), (IC∅L), (PCL), and qL ≤ q∅ ≤ qH . It will turn out that the solution of
the relaxed problem satisfies the ignored constraints, hence it is also the solution
9
of the original problem.9
In the solution of the relaxed problem the constraint (PCL) must be binding,
because otherwise we could increase the seller’s expected profit by slightly increas-
ing tL without violating any of the remaining constraints. Thus, it is optimal for
the seller to set
tL = qLRL. (1)
Similar arguments show that the constraints (IC∅L) and (ICH∅) must be binding.
Hence, it is optimal for the seller to set
t∅ = q∅E[R]− qL(E[R]−RL), (2)
tH = qHRH − q∅(RH − E[R])− qL(E[R]−RL). (3)
We can thus further simplify the seller’s problem by eliminating the transfer
payments. The seller chooses qH , q∅, and qL in order to maximize her expected
profit
νρRHqH + [(1− ν)E[R]− νρ(RH − E[R])]q∅ + [ν (1− ρ)E[R]− (E[R]−RL)]qL
subject to 0 ≤ qL ≤ q∅ ≤ qH ≤ 1. We define three threshold functions.
Definition 1 Let ν̂(ρ) = E[R]
E[R]+(RH−E[R])ρ
, ν̄(ρ) = E[R]−RL
E[R](1−ρ)
, and ν̃(ρ) = RL
ρRH
.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1 below, the sign of the coefficient of q∅ (resp.,
qL) in the seller’s objective function depends on whether ν is larger or smaller
than the threshold ν̂(ρ) (resp., ν̄(ρ)). Observe that ν̂(ρ) ∈ (0, 1), ν̄(ρ) > 0,
and ν̃(ρ) > 0. It is straightforward to show that there exists a critical value
ρ̂ ∈ (0, 1), such that ρ ≤ ρ̂ implies ν̄(ρ) ≤ ν̂(ρ) ≤ ν̃(ρ), and ρ ≥ ρ̂ implies
ν̃(ρ) ≤ ν̂(ρ) ≤ ν̄(ρ).10 Therefore, the following findings completely characterize
the solution to the seller’s problem.
Lemma 1 It is optimal for the seller to set qH = 1 and to set qL and q∅ as follows.
9For details, see Observation 1 in the Appendix.
10See Observation 2 in the Appendix.
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(i) Suppose ν > ν̂(ρ). If ν > ν̃(ρ), then qL = q∅ = 0. If ν = ν̃(ρ), then
0 ≤ qL = q∅ ≤ 1.
(ii) Suppose ν < ν̄(ρ). If ν < ν̂(ρ), then qL = 0, q∅ = 1. If ν = ν̂(ρ), then qL = 0,
0 ≤ q∅ ≤ 1.
(iii) Suppose ν < ν̃(ρ). If ν > ν̄(ρ), then qL = q∅ = 1. If ν = ν̄(ρ), then
0 ≤ qL ≤ 1, q∅ = 1.
(iv) If ν = ν̄(ρ) = ν̃(ρ) and hence ρ = ρ̂, then 0 ≤ qL ≤ 1 and qL ≤ q∅ ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. First observe that in the objective function the coefficient
of qH is positive, hence it is optimal for the seller to set qH = 1. Next, with
regard to the coefficient of q∅, the condition (1 − ν)E[R] − νρ(RH − E[R]) ≥ 0
is satisfied whenever ν ≤ ν̂(ρ). Regarding the coefficient of qL, observe that
ν (1− ρ)E[R]− (E[R]−RL) ≥ 0 whenever ν ≥ ν̄(ρ).
As a consequence, the following behavior is optimal for the seller. If v < ν̂(ρ),
the seller sets q∅ = 1. If v = ν̂(ρ), the seller is indifferent between all q∅ in the
unit interval. If v > ν̂(ρ), she sets q∅ = qL. Analogously, if ν < ν̄(ρ) the seller
sets qL = 0. If ν = ν̄(ρ), she is indifferent between all qL in the unit interval.
If ν > ν̄(ρ), she sets qL = q∅. Moreover, the seller prefers qL = q∅ = 1 to
qL = q∅ = 0 whenever ν is smaller ν̃(ρ). Hence, the claims made in the lemma
follow immediately. Observe that case (ii) can occur only if ρ ≤ ρ̂. Notice that
the lemma covers all conceivable cases due to Observation 2 which is shown in the
Appendix. 
Note that the cases in which the seller is indifferent between several contracts
will become relevant when we endogenize the information structure (see Section
5). For now we may simply assume as a tie breaking convention that in case of
indifference the seller offers the contract that is best for the buyer.
Proposition 1 Consider scenario U (uncertifiable information).
(i) If ν > ν̂(ρ) and ν > ν̃(ρ), the seller offers the menu (qH = 1, tH = RH),
(qL = 0, tL = 0), (q∅ = 0, t∅ = 0). The seller’s expected profit is νρRH , the
buyer’s expected profit is 0, and hence the expected total surplus is SU = νρRH .
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(ii) If ν ≤ ν̂(ρ) and ν < ν̄(ρ), the seller offers (qH = 1, tH = E[R]), (qL = 0,
tL = 0), (q∅ = 1, t∅ = E[R]). The seller’s expected profit is (1− ν)E[R] + νρE[R],
the buyer’s expected profit is νρ(RH − E[R]), and the expected total surplus is
SU = (1− ν)E[R] + νρRH .
(iii) If ν̄(ρ) ≤ ν ≤ ν̃(ρ), the seller offers (qH = 1, tH = RL), (qL = 1, tL = RL),
(q∅ = 1, t∅ = RL). The seller’s expected profit is RL, the buyer’s expected profit is
E[R]−RL, and the expected total surplus is SU = E[R].
Intuitively, the seller faces a trade-off between achieving an ex post efficient
outcome and reducing the buyer’s information rent. In case (i), the buyer is
informed with a large probability, and trade will occur only if the buyer knows
that we are in the good state of the world.11 While the outcome is not always ex
post efficient, it has the advantage that the seller does not have to leave a rent
to the buyer. In contrast, if the buyer is informed with a very small probability
(case ii), trade also takes place if the buyer is uninformed. This implies that when
the buyer knows that we are in the good state (which happens with probability
νρ), he must get a rent. Note that an ex post inefficiency occurs if the buyer is
informed (which is relatively unlikely in case ii) and we are in the bad state of the
world. Finally, when the buyer is informed with an intermediate probability (case
iii), trade always takes place, so ex post efficiency is achieved, and the buyer gets
the expected rent E[R]−RL, which is larger than the expected rent νρ(RH−E[R])
in case (ii).
As pointed out above, the revelation principle ensures that by characterizing
the seller’s optimal direct revelation mechanism, we can be sure that there exists
no contract whatsoever that could yield a larger expected profit for the seller.
Once we know the maximum expected profit, we can look for simple contracts
that attain this profit level. In the present case, observe that the seller can attain
her maximum expected profit by making a posted-price offer p, which the buyer
11Note that ν > ν̃(ρ) can hold only if ρRH > RL, hence it is more profitable for the seller to
trade only in the good state (so she can demand the payment RH) than to also trade in the bad
state (asking for the payment RL only). Moreover, when ν > ν̂(ρ) the event that the buyer is
uninformed is sufficiently unlikely, such that the seller refrains from trading also in this event
(since then she could demand the payment E[R] only).
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may either accept or reject. Specifically, if ν > ν̂(ρ) and ν > ν̃(ρ) it is optimal
for the seller to set p = RH . Indeed, only a buyer who observed the signal σ = H
will accept the offer p = RH . Hence, the same allocation will be implemented as
in case (i) of Proposition 1. Similarly, in case (ii) it is optimal for the seller to set
p = E[R], and in case (iii) it is optimal for her to set p = RL. To see this, note
that an offer p = E[R] will be accepted by the buyer if he has observed a signal
σ ∈ {H, ∅}, while an offer p = RL will always be accepted.
4.2 Scenario C : Certifiable information
We now study scenario C, where the buyer can no longer claim to have observed
σ = L or σ = H without presenting the underlying evidence. However, it is still
the case that the buyer can always claim to be uninformed (σ = ∅), even if this is
not true.
We again do not impose any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible con-
tracts. Thus, we consider direct revelation mechanisms that specify the trade
level qσ̂ ∈ [0, 1] and the transfer payment tσ̂ depending on the buyer’s claim
σ̂ ∈ {H,L, ∅}.12
The seller’s problem is thus to find a menu (qH , tH), (qL, tL), (q∅, t∅) that
maximizes her expected profit
ν[ρtH + (1− ρ)tL] + (1− ν)t∅
subject to the relevant constraints. Specifically, if the buyer has observed the sig-
nal σ = H, he has no incentive to conceal this information whenever the incentive-
compatibility constraint
qHRH − tH ≥ q∅RH − t∅ (ICH∅)
12See Green and Laffont (1986) for the revelation principle in the case of partially verifiable
information.
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is satisfied. Moreover, the constraint
qLRL − tL ≥ q∅RL − t∅ (ICL∅)
ensures that the buyer reveals the truth if σ = L. In addition, to make sure that it
is individually rational for the buyer to accept the seller’s offer, the participation
constraints
qHRH − tH ≥ 0, (PCH)
qLRL − tL ≥ 0, (PCL)
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ 0 (PC∅)
must hold. Observe that there are fewer constraints than in the case of uncerti-
fiable information, so it is clear that in scenario C the seller cannot be worse off
than in scenario U.
The constraint (PCH) is redundant, because it already follows from (ICH∅)
and (PC∅), due to the fact that RH > E[R]. The constraint (ICH∅) must be
binding, since otherwise the seller’s expected profit could be increased by slightly
increasing tH , without violating any of the remaining constraints. Similarly, the
participation constraint (PC∅) must be binding. Hence, it is optimal for the seller
to set
t∅ = q∅E[R], (4)
tH = qHRH − q∅(RH − E[R]). (5)
Note that (PCL) must be binding, because the right-hand side of constraint
(ICL∅) satisfies q∅RL − t∅ ≤ q∅E[R]− t∅ = 0. Thus,
tL = qLRL. (6)
We can now eliminate the transfer payments from the maximization problem.
The seller chooses qH , q∅, and qL in order to maximize her expected profit
νρRHqH + [(1− ν)E[R]− νρ(RH − E[R])]q∅ + ν (1− ρ)RLqL.
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Note that νρRH > 0 and ν (1− ρ)RL > 0. Furthermore, the coefficient of q∅
is positive whenever (1 − ν)E[R] − νρ(RH − E[R]) ≥ 0 is satisfied, which is the
case whenever ν ≤ ν̂(ρ). Thus, the following result must hold.
Lemma 2 In the solution to the seller’s problem, qH = qL = 1. Moreover, if
ν > ν̂(ρ), then q∅ = 0. If ν < ν̂(ρ), then q∅ = 1. If ν = ν̂(ρ), then 0 ≤ q∅ ≤ 1.
We have now found the solution to the seller’s problem in the case of certifiable
information.
Proposition 2 Consider scenario C (certifiable information).
(i) If ν > ν̂(ρ), the seller offers the menu (qH = 1, tH = RH), (qL = 1, tL = RL),
(q∅ = 0, t∅ = 0). The seller’s expected profit is νE[R], the buyer’s expected profit
is 0, and hence the expected total surplus is SC = νE[R].
(ii) If ν ≤ ν̂(ρ), the seller offers (qH = 1, tH = E[R]), (qL = 1, tL = RL), (q∅ = 1,
t∅ = E[R]). The seller’s expected profit is E[R] − νρ(RH − E[R]), the buyer’s
expected profit is νρ(RH − E[R]), and the expected total surplus is SC = E[R].
The seller again faces a trade-off between achieving ex post efficiency and
reducing the buyer’s rent. If the buyer is informed with a large probability (case
i), then trade takes place only if the buyer can provide evidence for the prevailing
state of the world. In this case, the buyer does not get a rent. In contrast, if
the buyer is informed with a small probability (case ii), trade always takes place,
so ex post efficiency is achieved. Yet, the buyer gets a rent when he knows that
we are in the good state (which happens with probability νρ). Observe that in
scenario C the buyer cannot be (strictly) better off than in scenario U.
Again, once we have found the optimal direct revelation mechanism that yields
the seller’s maximum expected profit, we can construct simple contracts that lead
to the same outcome. Specifically, note that the seller can attain her maximum
expected profit by offering to sell at a price p, unless the buyer proves that he
obtained the signal σ = L. In the latter case, the price is reduced to RL. The
buyer can then either accept to buy at the price p, or provide evidence for the
signal σ = L and buy at the price RL, or reject the offer. If ν > ν̂(ρ), it is optimal
for the seller to set p = RH . If ν ≤ ν̂(ρ), it is optimal for her to set p = E[R].
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4.3 Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information
We can now state our first main result, which follows from comparing the two
parties’ total profits derived in Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 (i) If ν ≤ ν̂(ρ) and ν ≥ ν̄(ρ), then the expected total surplus in
scenario U is the same as in scenario C.
(ii) If ν > ν̂(ρ) and ν ≤ ν̃(ρ), then the expected total surplus is smaller in scenario
C than in scenario U.
(iii) Otherwise, the expected total surplus is smaller in scenario U than in scenario
C.
The result is illustrated in Figure 1. Observe that if the probability ρ that we
are in the good state of the world is relatively small (the green area), trade always
takes place in both scenarios, so the expected total profits are SU = SC = E[R].
Intuitively, when it is sufficiently likely that we are in the bad state of the world,
the seller does not want to risk losing opportunities to trade by demanding a
larger payment. Hence, ex post efficiency is achieved.
Now suppose that the probability ν that the buyer has private information
is relatively small, but the good state has a sufficiently large probability ρ (the
blue area). In the case of uncertifiable information, the seller excludes the buyer
of type RL, because by doing so the seller can demand a payment E[R] instead
of only RL. Yet, in the case of certifiable information, the seller can demand
the payment E[R] and reduce it to RL whenever the buyer provides evidence for
σ = L, so trade always takes place. Hence, SU < SC = E[R].
Next, suppose that the buyer is informed with a large probability and the good
state is very likely (the brown area). When information is uncertifiable, trade
occurs only if the buyer knows that we are in the good state. The seller asks for
the largest possible payment RH , since it is rather unlikely that the buyer will
reject. When information is certifiable, the seller can offer to reduce the payment
to RL whenever the buyer provides evidence for σ = L, so only an uninformed
buyer is excluded from trade. As a result, SU < SC < E[R].
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Finally, let us consider the most interesting case. Suppose that the buyer is
informed with a large probability, but the probability of the good state is small (the
yellow area). In the case of uncertifiable information, trade always takes place,
because the seller does not want to risk losing opportunities to trade by demanding
a payment larger than RL. Yet, in the case of certifiable information, the seller
can demand the larger payment RH and offer to reduce it to RL whenever the
buyer provides evidence for σ = L. The seller thus excludes an uninformed buyer,
but it is profitable to do so since the probability that the buyer is uninformed is
relatively small. Therefore, SC < SU = E[R], so certifiable information can lead
to a strictly smaller total profit than uncertifiable information.
SU = SC = E[R]
SC < SU = E[R] SU < SC < E[R]














Figure 1. Exogenous information. Comparison of the expected total sur-
plus in scenario U (uncertifiable information) and scenario C (certifiable
information), depending on ρ (the probability of the good state of the world)
and ν (the probability that the buyer is informed).
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5 Endogenous information
So far, we have assumed that at date 0 the buyer learns the state of the world ω
with some exogenously given probability ν. At first glance, this assumption might
appear unfamiliar, because in many adverse selection models with uncertifiable
information it is assumed that the agent knows his type with certainty.13 We now
show that an information structure where the buyer is informed with a probability
strictly between 0 and 1may indeed arise endogenously when the buyer can gather
information before the contract is offered. Specifically, suppose that at date 0 the
buyer decides whether or not to incur information acquisition costs c > 0 in order
to learn the state of the world. The buyer’s decision is a hidden action, i.e. it
cannot be observed by the seller (regardless of whether we are in scenario U or in
scenario C).14 If the buyer incurs the information acquisition costs, he learns the
true state of the world (σ = ω), while otherwise he remains uninformed (σ = ∅).
It will turn out that in equilibrium the buyer may well acquire information with
a probability ν ∈ (0, 1).
5.1 Scenario U : Uncertifiable information
Consider the case of uncertifiable information, where the buyer is free to make any
claim σ̂ ∈ {H,L, ∅} about the signal σ. First observe that in equilibrium the buyer
will not always acquire information. To see this, suppose to the contrary the seller
believes that ν = 1, so that ν > ν̂(ρ). According to Proposition 1(i), if 1 > ν̃(ρ)
the seller would offer a contract that completely extracts the buyer’s expected
date-2 profit. Thus, the buyer’s profit at date 0 would be 0− c. The buyer would
prefer to deviate by remaining uninformed, so that his expected profit would be 0.
According to Proposition 1(iii), if 1 ≤ ν̃(ρ) the buyer’s expected profit at date 0
13Of course, in settings with certifiable information there would be no interesting screening
problem if the agent knew his type with certainty. The principal could then simply insist on
revelation of the information as a prerequisite for trade.
14We thus follow Crémer and Khalil (1992) and most of the subsequent literature on screening
models with endogenous information. See Kessler (1998) and Hoppe (2013) for models in which
a principal can observe an agent’s decision to gather information. Note that this literature does
not consider certifiable information.
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is E[R]−RL− c when he acquires information, while it would be E[R]−RL when
he deviated. Hence, in any case the buyer would prefer to remain uninformed, so
in equilibrium ν < 1 must hold.
To simplify the notation, we make the following definition.
Definition 2 Let ψ(ρ) = (RH − E[R])ρ.
Observe that there are parameter constellations such that in equilibrium the
buyer never acquires information. Suppose the seller believes that ν = 0. In this
case, given the seller’s optimal contract offer according to Proposition 1(ii), the
buyer’s expected date-0 profit is 0, while it would be (RH−E[R])ρ−c if the buyer
deviated by acquiring information. Hence, if c ≥ ψ(ρ) it is indeed optimal for the
buyer not to acquire information.
Now suppose that c < ψ(ρ), so that in equilibrium the buyer must acquire
information with a probability strictly between zero and one; i.e., he must be
indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring information. Since the seller will
always set qH = 1, the buyer’s expected profit when he acquires information is
ρ(RH − tH) + (1− ρ)(qLRL− tL)− c, while it is q∅E[R]− t∅ if he does not acquire
information. Recall that the transfer payments are given by (1), (2), and (3).
Hence, the buyer is indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring information
when q∅ − qL =
c
ψ(ρ)
, which lies strictly between zero and one. Inspection of
Lemma 1 reveals that this condition can be satisfied only if ν = ν̂(ρ) or ν = ν̄(ρ).
Hence, the following result must hold.15
Proposition 4 Consider scenario U (uncertifiable information).
(i) If c ≥ ψ(ρ), the buyer remains uninformed (ν = 0). The seller offers the menu
(qH = 1, tH = E[R]), (qL = 0, tL = 0), (q∅ = 1, t∅ = E[R]). The seller’s expected
profit is E[R], the buyer’s expected profit is 0, and hence the expected total surplus
is SU = E[R].
(ii) If c < ψ(ρ) and ρ ≤ ρ̂, the buyer acquires information with probability ν =
ν̄(ρ). The seller offers (qH = 1, tH =
c
ψ(ρ)
E[R] + (1 − c
ψ(ρ)




15Note that in the knife-edge case c < ψ(ρ) and ρ = ρ̂, due to Lemma 1(iv) the seller is






)RL), (q∅ = 1, t∅ =
c
ψ(ρ)
E[R] + (1− c
ψ(ρ)
)RL). The seller’s expected
profit is RL, the buyer’s expected profit is E[R]−RL−
c
1−ρ
, and the expected total




(iii) If c < ψ(ρ) and ρ > ρ̂, the buyer acquires information with probability ν =
ν̂(ρ). The seller offers (qH = 1, tH =
c
ψ(ρ)
E[R] + (1− c
ψ(ρ)







E[R]). The seller’s expected profit is ν̂(ρ)ρRH , the buyer’s
expected profit is 0, and the expected total surplus is SU = ν̂(ρ)ρRH .
Now that we have derived the seller’s maximum expected profits, we can again
provide simple contracts that achieve the optimum. It is intuitively clear that
when the information acquisition costs are prohibitively large (case i), the buyer
will remain uninformed. In this case, a posted-price mechanism with p = E[R]
is optimal. When the information acquisition costs are sufficiently small, the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Specifically, if the probability of the good state
of the world is small (case ii), the buyer acquires information with probability ν̄(ρ),
and the seller mixes between the posted prices p = E[R] (which is offered with
probability c
ψ(ρ)
) and p = RL (which is offered otherwise). Note that the buyer
will always accept the offer, except when he learned the signal σ = L and the price
p = E[R] is offered. Hence, the same expected payoffs will be attained as with the
direct revelation mechanism characterized in part (ii) of the proposition. If the
probability of the good state is large (case iii), the buyer acquires information with
probability ν̂(ρ), and the seller mixes between the posted prices p = E[R] (which
is offered with probability c
ψ(ρ)
) and p = RH (which is offered otherwise). It is
again easy to verify that in this way the same expected payoffs will be attained
as with the direct revelation mechanism derived in part (iii) of the proposition.
5.2 Scenario C : Certifiable information
Now consider the case of certifiable information, where the buyer cannot claim
to have observed σ = L or σ = H without presenting the underlying evidence,
while the buyer can always claim to be uninformed (σ = ∅). It is again easy to
see that in equilibrium the buyer will not always acquire information. Indeed,
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suppose the seller believed that ν = 1. According to Proposition 2(i), the seller
would offer a contract that extracts the buyer’s expected date-2 profit. Hence,
the buyer’s expected profit at date 0 would be 0 − c. The buyer would prefer to
deviate by remaining uninformed, so that his expected profit would be 0. Thus,
in equilibrium ν < 1 must hold.
Yet, there are parameter constellations such that the buyer never acquires
information. Suppose the seller believes that ν = 0. According to Proposition
2(ii), the seller offers a contract such that the buyer’s expected profit is 0. When
c ≥ ψ(ρ), deviating by acquiring information is not a profitable strategy for the
buyer, since then his expected profit at date 0 would be ψ(ρ)− c ≤ 0.
It follows that if c < ψ(ρ), then in equilibrium the buyer must acquire infor-
mation with a probability ν strictly between zero and one. Recall that the seller
will always set qL = qH = 1, so the buyer is indifferent between acquiring and not
acquiring information whenever ρ(RH − tH) + (1− ρ)(RL − tL)− c = q∅E[R]− t∅






< 1, Lemma 2 implies that in equilibrium ν = ν̂(ρ) must hold. Hence,
we have derived the following result.
Proposition 5 Consider scenario C (certifiable information).
(i) If c ≥ ψ(ρ), the buyer remains uninformed (ν = 0). The seller offers the
menu (qH = 1, tH = E[R]), (qL = 1, tL = RL), (q∅ = 1, t∅ = E[R]). The seller’s
expected profit is E[R], the buyer’s expected profit is 0, and hence the expected
total surplus is SC = E[R].
(ii) If c < ψ(ρ), the buyer acquires information with probability ν = ν̂(ρ). The












E[R]). The seller’s expected profit is ν̂(ρ)E[R], the buyer’s expected profit
is 0, and the expected total surplus is SC = ν̂(ρ)E[R].
Intuitively, when the information acquisition costs are sufficiently large, the
buyer will not gather information. A simple contract that yields the same expected
payoffs as the direct revelation mechanism derived in case (i) is a posted-price
contract with p = E[R], where the price is reduced to RL if and only if the buyer
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provides evidence that he obtained the signal σ = L. If the information acquisition
costs are large (case ii), the buyer gathers information with probability ν = ν̂(ρ),
and the seller mixes between the aforementioned contract (which is offered with
probability c
ψ(ρ)
) and a similar contract with p = RH (which is offered otherwise).
5.3 Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information
We can now compare the expected total profits derived in Propositions 4 and 5.





such that ν̂(ρ)E[R] is smaller (larger) than E[R] − c
1−ρ
whenever c is smaller
(larger) than ĉ(ρ).
Proposition 6 (i) If c ≥ ψ(ρ), or if ρ ≤ ρ̂ and c = ĉ(ρ), then the expected total
surplus in scenario U is the same as in scenario C.
(ii) If ρ ≤ ρ̂ and c < ĉ(ρ), then the expected total surplus is smaller in scenario C
than in scenario U .
(iii) Otherwise, the expected total surplus is smaller in scenario U than in scenario
C.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2. If the information acquisition costs are
prohibitively large, then in both scenarios the buyer will refrain from strategically
acquiring information (the blue area). In this case, the buyer is always willing to
pay E[R] and ex post efficiency is achieved, so SU = SC = E[R]. Now suppose
that the costs of acquiring information are sufficiently small. It is not surprising
that there are parameter constellations (the green area and the brown area) such
that the expected total profit is smaller in the case of uncertifiable information,






SU = SC = E[R]
SC < SU < E[R]
SU < SC < E[R]






Figure 2. Endogenous information. Comparison of the expected total
surplus in scenario U (uncertifiable information) and scenario C (certifiable
information), depending on ρ (the probability of the good state of the world)
and c (the costs of acquiring information).
Yet, Proposition 6(ii) shows that when the probability of the good state is
small, certifiable information can lead to an even larger efficiency loss than uncer-
tifiable information (the yellow area). This is the most interesting case. Specif-
ically, trade always takes place when the buyer knows that we are in the good
state. When information is uncertifiable, the seller mixes between the prices E[R]
and RL, so an uninformed buyer is never excluded. In contrast, when information
is certifiable, the seller mixes between the prices E[R] and RH , since she can offer
to reduce the price to RL whenever the buyer provides evidence for the signal
σ = L. As a consequence, an uninformed buyer may be excluded, which explains
why SC < SU < E[R] can hold.
Observe that the yellow area in Figure 2 (where the information structure is
endogenous) corresponds qualitatively to the yellow area in Figure 1 (where the
information structure is exogenous). In both cases, the expected total surplus
given certifiable information can be smaller than the expected total surplus given
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uncertifiable information when the probability of the good state is relatively small
and when the buyer is informed with a relatively large probability (which happens
when the information gathering costs are small in the case of an endogenous
information structure).
6 Discussion
In reality, the nature of private information held by firms may well be different
from the nature of private information that a consumer has about his or her taste.
Hence, screening models with uncertifiable information may not always capture
the specifics of private information in contracting between firms. For example,
in an M&A context the management of a target company might have verifiable
evidence about the value of its intangible assets. In such cases, the buyer may thus
have certifiable information. Moreover, the buyer may decide whether or not to
acquire such information for strategic reasons. The present paper has shown that
even though the buyer has fewer possibilities to make false claims in the case of
certifiable information, the resulting frictions may sometimes be even more severe
than those caused by uncertifiable information.
We hope that the present paper will encourage new follow-up research, em-
ploying both theoretical and experimental methods.
First, from a standard theory perspective, one might study more general signal
structures and information acquisition technologies.16 Moreover, while we have
focused on opportunistic information acquisition, future research may also study
productive information gathering. Furthermore, while we have considered take-
it-or-leave-it contract offers, the implications of more general bargaining games
could be explored.
Second, the behavioral literature has argued that decision makers often have
16For example, another way to model information acquisition by the buyer would be to let him
discover the true state of the world only with a probability π < 1. Note that if π ≤ ν̂(ρ), then in
the case of certifiable information according to Proposition 2(ii) the buyer gets an information
rent even when it is known that he always gathers information. Thus, in contrast to the situation
studied in Proposition 5, for sufficiently small information acquisition costs the buyer’s expected
profit can then be strictly positive also in the case of certifiable information.
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a preference for honesty. While screening problems would become irrelevant if
everyone were completely honest, a more realistic view might be that some people
have a bad conscience when misrepresenting information, but find it less repugnant
to conceal information.17 Hence, even when information is uncertifiable, people
might behave as if we were in the case of certifiable information. Note that our
results imply that the expected total surplus given such partially honest decision
makers can be even smaller than the expected total surplus given completely
opportunistic decision makers.
Third, experimental research might explore the relevance of this behavioral
interpretation. Moreover, Hoppe and Schmitz (2013b) seems to be the only lab-
oratory experiment so far that investigates a screening problem with endogenous
information gathering. Thus, there is ample scope for experimental work explor-
ing the differences between certifiable and uncertifiable information in situations
where information can be endogenously acquired.
Fourth, private information is especially likely to be relevant when assets are
of an innovative nature. Thus, it could be worthwhile to study the different
implications of certifiable and uncertifiable information for the incentives to make
innovations.18
Fifth, in some instances disclosure laws might influence whether a buyer ac-
quires certifiable or uncertifiable information. Future research exploring the inter-
play between the institutional framework and the nature of acquired information
seems to be very promising.19
17Such preferences would be in the spirit of Spranca et al. (1991), who report that people
often rate harmful omissions as less immoral than harmful commissions.
18For instance, there is a recent debate about whether public-private partnerships can fos-
ter innovations (see e.g. Carbonara and Pellegrino, 2020, and the literature discussed there).
A prominent example of a public-private partnership is President Trump’s “Operation Warp
Speed”, which has enabled the United States to rapidly develop and distribute vaccines against
the novel coronavirus that recently originated in China. While the role of uncertifiable informa-
tion for incentives to innovate in public-private partnerships has been studied in the literature
(cf. Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013a; Buso, 2019), I am not aware of any papers that explore certifiable
information in this context.
19In this context it might also be worthwhile to study screening problems with hybrid infor-
mation structures where verification is costly, as in the literature on debt contracts initiated
by Townsend (1979). On disclosure laws, see also the recent work by Schweizer (2017) and the
literature discussed there.
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Finally, in the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Gross-
man and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) it is usually assumed
that there is symmetric information, so ex post efficiency is always achieved. In
contrast, Williamson (2000, 2002) has emphasized the importance of ex post in-
efficiencies in transaction cost economics. Some authors have studied the role of
asymmetric information in hold-up problems and in variants of the Grossman-
Hart-Moore approach, which can explain ex post inefficiencies (see e.g. Schmitz,
2006; Goltsman, 2011; Goldlücke and Schmitz, 2014; Su, 2017b).20 Yet, these
papers consider uncertifiable information only. In future work, we plan to explore
the role of certifiable information in the property rights approach to the theory of
the firm.
20For alternative approaches to ex post inefficiencies, see also Mori (2017) on haggling and
Mori (2020) on ex post adaptations.
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Appendix
Observation 1. The solution to the seller’s relaxed problem in Section 4.1 [where
only the constraints (ICH∅), (IC∅L), (PCL), and qL ≤ q∅ ≤ qH were considered] is
also the solution to the seller’s original problem, because it satisfies the omitted
constraints (ICHL), (ICLH), (ICL∅), (IC∅H), (PCH), and (PC∅).
Proof. If we plug in the expressions for the transfer payments tL, t∅, and tH that
were derived in (1), (2), and (3), all omitted constraints turn out to be satisfied:21
qHRH − tH ≥ qLRH − tL (ICHL)
⇔ q∅(RH − E[R]) + qL(E[R]−RL) ≥ qLRH − qLRL
⇔ q∅(RH − E[R]) ≥ qL(RH − E[R])
qLRL − tL ≥ qHRL − tH (ICLH)
⇔ 0 ≥ qHRL − qHRH + q∅(RH − E[R]) + qL(E[R]−RL)
⇔ 0 ≥ qHRL − qHRH + q∅(RH − (ρRH + (1− ρ)RL))
+qL((ρRH + (1− ρ)RL)−RL)
⇔ 0 ≥ (RL −RH)(qH − q∅ + (q∅ − qL)ρ)
qLRL − tL ≥ q∅RL − t∅ (ICL∅)
⇔ 0 ≥ q∅RL − q∅E[R] + qL(E[R]−RL)
⇔ 0 ≥ (q∅ − qL)(RL − E[R])
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ qHE[R]− tH (IC∅H)
⇔ qL(E[R]−RL) ≥ qHE[R]− qHRH + q∅(RH − E[R]) + qL(E[R]−RL)
⇔ 0 ≥ (qH − q∅)(E[R]−RH)
21To see this, recall that in the solution qL ≤ q∅ ≤ qH holds.
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qHRH − tH ≥ 0 (PCH)
⇔ q∅(RH − E[R]) + qL(E[R]−RL) ≥ 0
q∅E[R]− t∅ ≥ 0 (PC∅)
⇔ qL(E[R]−RL) ≥ 0

Observation 2. There exists a critical value ρ̂ ∈ (0, 1), such that ρ ≤ ρ̂ implies
ν̄(ρ) ≤ ν̂(ρ) ≤ ν̃(ρ), and ρ ≥ ρ̂ implies ν̃(ρ) ≤ ν̂(ρ) ≤ ν̄(ρ).







E[R] + (RH − E[R])ρ
⇔ E[R] (1− ρ)E[R]− (E[R] + (RH − E[R])ρ)(E[R]−RL) ≥ 0









⇔ (E[R] + (RH − E[R])ρ)RL − E[R]ρRH ≥ 0
⇔ (1− ρ)RLE[R]− ρ (E[R]−RL)RH ≥ 0.
Hence, it holds that ν̄(ρ) ≤ ν̂(ρ) whenever ν̂(ρ) ≤ ν̃(ρ). Now define
f(ρ) := (1− ρ)RLE[R]− ρ (E[R]−RL)RH .








L) ρ + R
2
L. A straightforward intermediate value argument implies
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that there must exist a unique ρ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(ρ̂) = 0, because f(0) =
R2L > 0, f(1) = (RL −RH)RH < 0, and f
′′(ρ) = 2(R2L −R
2
H) < 0. 
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